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Inflation, Resource Utilization, and Debt and Equity Returns
ABSTRACT
Enormouslydiverse real and nominal ex post returns on equity and
shortand long term debt securities have accompanied substantial variations
in inflation and resource utilization during the past half century. This
paper contains an examination of the relationships among these security
returns and an analysis of the effects of inflation and resource
utilization on the relationships.
The three major results are the following. First, prior to the
Treasury—Federal Reserve Accord in 1951, nominal yields on one—month
Treasury bills were reasonably stable, while real bill rates were incredibly
volatile. Since 1952, the reverse has been true. Nominal bill rates have
cycled around a rising trend, and real bill rates have stayed near zero.
Second, changes in yields on new—issue, long—term bonds have been largely
unanticipated, and these changes have dominated the realized returns on
bonds relative to Treasury bills. Because bond rates have risen with
(unexpected) inflation during the last fifteen years, bonds have earned
negative real returns. Third, the relative returns on equities and bonds
are greatly affected by the business cycle with equities performing very
well around troughs and very poorly around peaks. This has been true
for all ten troughs since 1926 and all six peaks since 1946.
Patric H. Hendershott
Krannert Graduate School of
Management
Purdue University
West Lafayette, Indiana 47906
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Introduction
Duringthelast half century, the American economy has been subjected
to numerous shocks. The greatest of these were the depression and
WorldWar II, but there were also other wars, OPEC and Itregulart?
business cycles. As a result, both resource utilization and inflation
have varied widely, and enormously diverse real and nominal ex post
returnsonequity and short and long-term debt securities have
accompanied these variations.
This paper contains an examination of the relationships among these
security returns and an analysis of theeffects of inflation and
resourceutilization on the relationships. More specifically, I will
reporton the impact of inflation on: Treasury bill rates, the realized
returns on Treasury bonds versus bills, and realized returns on
equities versus corporate bonds. Further, I will discuss the relationship
between the business cycle and realized returns on equities versus bonds.
Thus,theanalysis provides a background for the fundamentalportfolio
decision regarding the broad division of investable funds into
equities,long-term debt and short-term debt.
Beforeturning to the analysis, a few words about the data are in
order. First, all of the underlyingyield data. --equities,corporate2
bonds, Treasury bonds and Treasury bills --arethose ccRrrpiled by Ibbotson
andSinquefield (19'7'9, 1980).Theseare roughlyrepresentative of returns on
economy-wide"rsarket"portfolios andareavailable monthly for the
1926-7'8period. Second, these yields are realized, rather thanexpected
returns, except for those on Treasury bills which are bothexpected and
realized because their one-month maturity equals theperiod over which
the returns are calculated. Third, the returns--incomeplus capital
gains (except for bills) -arebefore-tax returns. They are not truly
representative of what either highly-taxed or tax-exempt investorsactually
earned after tax (both investorgnoups pràsumably would have opted for
portfolios with different relative income and capital gainscomponents
than the market average, and the former, ofcourse, paid taxes). Hopefully
differential returns, at least, are roughlyrepresentative of those
earned by most investors.
Inflation and Treasury Bill Returns
During the 1926-80 period there was a single episode of significant
deflation, 1930-32. In those three years the inflation rateranged
from -6 to -10 percent. Modest deflation also occurred in1926-27,
1938, and ]99. In contrast, there have been threesignificant
bursts of inflation --thebeginning of World War II (9percentin
l941 and 19b2), the postwarsurge (18 percent in 19136 and 9percent3
in 19117) end the korean War scare (6perceflt 1951)--and the
prolonged post-1967 inflationary era, The cflationbaa ranged
frc elight1r over 14 percent (adjusting for t of price contro1
in 2$71-72) to double digitinflationin 197&. tn in 1979-80.
The above overview of the 1926.80 perioi that division
of these yesre into fc*r subperiods might These are 1926-19110
(vbich ixzclwles the depression and allyears det deflation
except 1919), 19141-51 (which includes the irit: spurts of World
War II, its aftereth, and the outbreak of tb conflict), 1952-67
(the era of stable iees), and 1968-80 (the inflationary period),
The first two eobmns of Table 3. present the standard deviations
far theannualinflation rate for these and @jjperiods.The
great differences in the mean inflation rat* & variability are
obvious,
The next fair colu,n list means and stI viation for both
the ninal and real one-onth Treasury bill As can be seen,
there is an enors difference in the riabi1tzthe real bill.
rate between 1926..5l and 1952..80, In the latt:ziodthe standard
eviation of the real. bill, rate, 1,5 percents, three-fifths of
that of the ninal bill rate, 2.6 percent; iiarlierperiod
the former, 6.14percent,is over five ts tt 1.2 percent.
Division of the earlier interval into 1926J40Ai1-51 reveals
enozis variability in the real bill rate (aility in the nominal
rate). The mean real bill s a full 2.8 per : 1926-130 andan





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































was due to the monetary authorities'policyof pegging nominal interest
rates at low levels during a period of significant inflation. The
high real rate in the 1930s is largely attributable to the combination
of the general nonnegativity constraint on the nc*ninal rate and the
existence of significant deflation.However,it is noteworthy that
the real bill rate exoeeded 14 percent in al]. years in the 1926-30 period
during which the nonnegativity constraint was not binding (the nom(nil
billrate ranged from 2.14 to 14.7 percent).
Figure 1 illustrates the enormous difference between the 1926-51
and 1952-80 periods in the volatility of both the nom(rinl and real bill
rate.. In the former period the ncminal rate declinesinthe early
1930. and ii then flat; in the latter period this rate cycles around
a Eharply rising trend (the 1960 average bill rate of 11 percent disguises
variations in monthly rates between less than 7 percent and over i6
percent).In contrast,the real bill rate varied betweena plus 12 percent
in1931 and 1932toa minus 15 percent in 19146.Itsoften cited stability
clearly referstothe post 1951 periodonly.
Eventhereduced variability of the real bill rate in the 1952-80
period(plus 2 to minus 14 percent)is possiblyanoverstatement offuture
variability because thesharplynegative rates of 1973 and especially19714
are unlikely to recur. Short-term bill rates became "out of line"
relative to short-term rates on large CDa, comeercial paper, and bankers
acceptancesin1973, ani. especially 19714. To illustrate, the spread
between yield.s6 month CDs endbillsincreased in 19714 relative to
norl jeers by about 110 basis points and the spread between yields on 3 month









































































































































































































































segxaentedfrom rksta for private short-term securities during this
period of d.ts intermediation.Because only biLls were available in
anmller dencin&tiona, households were able to shift deposit funds only
into biLls. Because corporations did not have sufficient bill holdings
to arbitrage between the bill and private security merketa and comircia].
banks and municipalities had nonyield reasons for intaining bill holdings,
bill rates fell relative to other yields. As a result, expected inflat ion
was not fully reflected in bill rates •Infact, the enormous disparity
between private and U.S. short-term yields in 197k was the driving force
behind the creation of the money market fund, en entity that will prevent
such disparities from recurring.
Inflation and. Relative Returns on Equities,, Bonds and Bills
The first two columns in Table 2 repeat the same columns in Table 1
(except that 1979 and 1980 are excluded). The third and fourth columns
record the mean and standard deviation of the difference between the
annual returns earned on equities and corporate bonds. Equities earned
a 7percentagepoint premium over both the 1926-51 and 1952-78 eubperiod*.
However, when these periods are further subdivided, the enormous variability
of this premium becomes apparent. Thepremiumwas much greater in the
1930s, 1950e and 1960a than in the 1930s and 1970s .Itwould appear
from these data that there is no si1e relationship between the premium
and either the mean or standard deviation of the inflation rate.7a
Nonetheless, two of my co—authors in this volume have argued that the
increased inflation (combined with the excessive taxation ofcorporate
income -Feldstein)and the increased uncertainty regarding inflation
(and the economy generally -lvlalkiel)are causes of the relatively poor
performance of equities duringthepast fifteen years. My own view
is that these phenomena explain the relatively modest rise inpromised
new-issue debt yields (decline in real after-tax yields), but not the
sharp decline in share values (Hendershott 1981).
The last two columns in Table 2 report the mean and standard
deviation of the difference between the annualreturnsearned on US.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































large,3.8 percent, in the l926-1O period, and it was a negative one
percent in the 1952-67 and 1968-78 periods. The reason for these
differences is apparently unanticipated movements in interest rates.
To illustrate, if yields fall unexpectedly, then prices of long-term
bonds will rise unexpectedly and the one year return on bonds will be
large. This was apparently the case in the l930a (the one month bill
rat. declined from an average of over 3percentin 1926-30 to less than
percent in the 1933-hO period). In contrast, if yields rise unexpectedly,
then prices of long-term bonds will fall unexpectedly and the oneyear
retn on bonds will he low. This apparently has happened in the post 1952
period (the one-month bill rate rose frcsa l percent in 1952-55to
percent in 196hi67 to over 6percentin 1973-78).
It is important to note that only unanticipated movements in interest
rates have such impacts on the difference in realized returns on bonds
and bills. Par cample, if long-term bond rates were expected to rise
during the year, then bonds would be priced at the beginning of the
year such that a. high incone return wou]4 offset the anticipated capital
loss •Inthis case, the difference in ex post returns on honda and bills
would be independent of observed chAnges in new issue bond yields. To
determine whether changes in bond yields bays been anticipated or unantici-
pated, yield data on new-issue equivalent 20 year U.S. government bonds
were collected! Pigwe 2 contains plots of the difference in ex post
annual yields on bonds and bills (the "turity" premium of Ibbotson
sad Sinquefield) for the 1953-78 period and the change in the new issue
bond yield (scaled by a factor of 1.0) between the beginning and end of






















































































































































































































































































































































































change. in bond yields wereunanticipated and have been the prinm.ry
determinant of differences in therealized yie].ds on bondsandbills.
The Business C,'cle arid Returnson Eujtje and Bonds
Our next effort is to determinewhether the performance of equity
investiDentS ii particuljsuperior or inferior to that of bond investments
during any stage of the busineascycle. The National Bureau's reference
dates, which are emp1c as agenerj. guide to the stages of the business
cycle, are listed in Table 3. In the1926-78 period, ten full cycle.
have OCcurred. Zc1u4iag tue e3month depress ion, contractions haveranged
fran 8 to 16 months and have hadan average duration of 11 months.
Excluding the 80 and 106 month wartime(World War II and Vietnam)
expansions, upswings have varied fran 21 to58 months in duration and.
have averaged 39 months.
Annualized differences inequity and bond returns over different
phases of the cycle have beencCared. For contractions, the first and
last 5 months (which overlap forthe two 8 month contractions) were
examined, For expansions, thefirst, second, third, and last six months
were studied (the last two periodsoverlap during the 21 month upswing in
the late 1920.). The cycleswere divided into the 1926-52 and 1953-78
subperiods, and means and standard deviationsof the differences in equity
and bond returns were calculatedfor the 5 pre1953 cycles, the 5post1952
cycles, and all 10 cycles. A quickexamination of the data revealed
that equities tend to earna re].ativejy superior return (recall that
on average the annualized returnon equities exceeds that on bonds byTab].* 3BusinessCycle ReferenceDates: 1926 to 1980
Duration in months










NoveThber 1927... . . . . . . . . . August 1929. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 21






october 19145... ... . . . . . . . November19148.. . . . . . . . . . . 8 37
October 19149............. July 1953..............., 11 145






Februaryl96l.......,.... Decemberl969........., 10 106
1vember 1970. . . . . . . . . . . .Nov'enber1973. .. . • • • •, •• • 1], 36
March 1975. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. (Jarruax'y1980) ... . .. . . ... . 16 8
Average, all, cycles:
10 cycles, 1926—1978. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..








a. 1]. months,excludingthegreat depression b. 39months,excluding the WorldWar 11 andVietnam cycles
Source: National Bureau of Econanic Research, Inc.13
7 percent) late in contractions anearly in expansions and a relatively
interior return late inexpansions and early in contractions.
Table 4hasbeen constructed to highlight thisresults. The means
(and standard deviations)over all 10 cycles in the 1926-78 periodare
listed at the bottaa of the table.The mean net return on equities
is 20 percent in the last fivemonths of contractions (column 1) and
38 percent in the first sixmonths of expansions (column 2). On the
other hand, this net return is -20percent in the first five months of
contractions (column 3). (Themean net return during the other six
month phases of the expansionswas around the normal 6percent.)While
the mean net equity returnsare large (in absolute value) during these
periods, their variability is also large.Statistically, this is revealed
by the fact that none of thesemeans is twice the size of its st&ndard
error. Inspection of the indiyiducycle datum also indicates numerous
"Outliers."
The most pronounced outlier ia thenet equity return in the recovery
of 1933, 125 percent; the othernet returns in the first six monthsof
upswings in the pre1952 periodvary within the narrow 23 to 36percent
band. Interestingly, the secondmost pronounced outlier appears to be
the return in the imed.iat.].ypreceding period, the end of the 1932-33
contraction. Rather than thenormally high return, -37percentwas
earned. Thus, the incredibly high returnin the middle of 1933 is largely
a catch up for or offset to the lowreturn in late 1932 and early 1933.
The return over the full latecontract ion-early expansion period seems










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Moreover, the •a. pattern occurs in 1957, when the highest postl952
excess return early in the upswing, 50percent,is preceded by the only
negative excess return in the late contraction months•Itwould appear
that the variance in net equity returns over the, tull latecontraction-
eerI.y expe.ns ion period would be con4erabiy lena than the variance in
returns in either the late contraction or earlyupswing months. The
third column in Table Ii ir4icatas that this is indeed thecase. The
aean net return on equities for the last six months of a contraction
and first six months of the following expansionover all cycles is
26 percent, and it has a standard deviationof only 7 percent. Moreover,
this is also roughly the case for both the first and lastfive cycles
Thus, th. net equity returns are significantly positive at the 0.05
level, eM this is even true if the "normal" net return of 6percent
is taken into account.
A sossewbat siaflar pattern appears in late expansions andearly
contractions during the postl953 period. The two largestnegative net
equity returns in early recession months (column 5),-116percent in late
1957 and -39 percent in early 1970, were preceded by theonly positive
net equity returns in late expansions (column 1), 211percent and 6percent,
respectively. The lsat column in Table 1 reports the net equity return ithelast six months of an expansion and the first six months of
the following recession; a].]. are negative in the 1953-78period.
Moreover, the mean net extraordinary return (the .9percentreturn less
the normal 6percent)for these 5 cycles is -15 percent with a. 5 percent
standard deviation. Thus, the net extraordinary returnsare significantly.16
negative in the late stages of the expansion and the early stages of the
contraction. (This is not true, however, for cycles prior to 1953).
Apossibleproblem with th. above calculations is the oceiparison
of the net returns around turning points with a conata.nt "normal" 6
percent return.Themean net annual return on equities was shown in
Table 2 to vary widely between different "eras;" the net return was only
2 percent in the 1926-leO period, about 13 percent in the 191-67 span,
and actually negative in the recent 1968-78 years. This suggests that
net returns around turning points should be conpe.red with the average
net returns in surrounding years, rather than over the entire half
century. To accomplish this, we have first divided the months between
January 1926 and December 1978 into three types of periods: those around
troughs in which equity returns appear to be superior, those around peaks
in which equity returns appear to be relatively inferior, and the remainder.
The inferior periods are defined as the last six months of every expansion
and the tint half (dropping fractions) or first six months, whichever
is less, of every contraction. The superior periods are defined as the
last half (dropping fractions) or last six months, whichever is lees,
of every contraction and the first aix months of every expansion. The
second step in this comparison is to divide the total 1926-78 period
into ten overlapping intervals that contain single adjoin 1ng peaks and
troughs and all the aurrouMing months that do not overlap with adjacent
superior and inferior periods. That is, the intervals extend from
6 months after a trough to 6 months before the second following peak.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Also listed are the aritbaetic ee.ns (annualized) during: the &upericr
periods vithin the interval, the inferior periods, and all nths excluding
such periods. The nean in the latter mouths is the "normal" returnto
which the an returnsaroundthe trough and peak arecoipared.
The cca.riaon is made in columns 4and5,wherethe normal return
has been subtractedfrouthe superior and inferior returns, respectively.
These results are even restrikingthan those in Table 4.Theextra-
ordinarynetreturns on equities around troughs average 24 percent,
end no net return islees than13 percent.In contrast, the extraordinary
net returrs on equities are negativearoundall peaks except that at the
endof WorldWar II. Theaverage netreturn around peaks is -20 percent.
If the ana3.ysis isrestrictedto the last 6cycles,then the average
extraordinarynet return on equities around peaks is -.24 percent and the
standard deviation isonly 6 percent.
Summary
The results of our investigation of the impacts over the past half
centuryof inflation and the business cycle on realized yields on equities,
long-termdebtand short-termdebt canbesummarized intermsof three
relationships.Each is presentedin turn.
First,prior to the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord in 1951,nominal
yieldson one-month Treasury bills were reasonably stable while real
bill rates were incredibly volatile. This was largely due to the
nonnegativity constraint on nominal bill rates during the rapid deflation19
in the early 1930s (and 1938 and 19149,to a lesser extent) and the pegging
(atlow levels) of nominal interest ratesduring the rapid inflation
early in World War II andinthe Korean Conflict and following the former.
Since 1952, the reverse has been true.Nominal bill rate have cycled
around a rising trend, and real bill rates havestayed near zero. Short
term bills have been a hedge against inflationduring the last thirty years.
Second, changes in long-term new-issue bond yields have beenlargely
unanticipated, andthesechanges have dominated the realized returns
on bonds relative to Treasury bills. Because bondrates have risen with
(unexpected) inflation during the last fifteenyears, bonds have earned
negative real returns.
Third,therelative returns on equities and bondsare greatly affected
bythe business cycle with equitiesperforming very well around troughs
and very poorly around peaks.Extraordinary net (of bond returns) equity
returns have averaged 214. percentper annum inthe(roughly) year surrounding
troughs over the tencyclessince 1926and havenever been less than
13percent. Incontrast, these returns have averaged -214 percent in
the (roughly) year surroundingpeaks over the six cycles since 1946 and
have never been higher than-114 percent.Patric H. Hendershott
20
Footnotes
1This paper is based upon a larger ongoing study by Roger D. Huang and
myself (1982). The underlying study provides econometric support for
manyofthe propositions advanced in this paper.
2Data for nominal bill rates in 1979 and 1980 have been computed from
the one-month tax-adjusted bill rates calculated by Huston MeCulloch,
whom I thank for makingthemavailable to me. To check the comparability
of these rates with those of Ibbotson and Sinquefield, I computed
the annual return on one month bills from McCulloch's data, 7.23 percent,
and found that it differed little from that based on the I-S data,
7.18 percent. The method for calculating tax-adjusted yields is presented
in J. Huston McCulloch (1975).
3me premium equities earned over Treasury bills is very similarexcept
for the i926_140interval.As is indicated in the last column of Table 2,
government bonds outperformed government bills by nearly 1 percentage
points per annuminthis period, resulting in the equity premium over
billsbeing much larger than that over bonds.
1The data were kindly supplied by Huston McCulloch. See footnote 2
fora reference describing construction ofthedata.Patric H. Hendershott
21
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